Israel-Palestine, a touchstone issue for people across the Middle East and beyond, is – yet again – at the top of policy-makers’ agenda. A steadily rising death toll; the changed regional circumstances following the Iraq war; the belated release of the roadmap, have all highlighted the need to resume – once more – the search for peace.
Tony Klug‘s impassioned plea for an international protectorate to take over the West Bank and Gaza is both tightly-argued and incredibly ambitious. He is certainly right that sustained international involvement will be necessary to push and cajole the parties to reach a final settlement. The line – popular among ‘team Bush’ – that the peace process is not a priority and can anyway only proceed as fast as the parties are willing to go is defeatist and misguided: it hands a veto to those groups on both sides that do not want a peace accord at all.
In recent years it has become something of a cliché to argue that Israelis, Palestinians and outsiders all know what the eventual deal will look like. But it is also becoming clear that the parties themselves, if left to their own devices, will probably not be able to come to a sustainable agreement. Leading Israelis, such as Shlomo Ben-Ami, and prominent Palestinians such as Sari Nusseibeh, have called upon the outside world to impose a settlement.
In turn, Europeans, Americans and others know (or at least they should) that all the other objectives in the region – such as tackling fanatical terrorism, stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and encouraging political reforms – would all be easier to achieve if they made promoting an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord a real priority.
So the task ahead is to identify the means whereby the goal that everyone has signed up to – a two-state solution, an end to occupation, and ironclad security guarantees for Israel – can be achieved and sustained. The roadmap is supposed to provide that missing link. But Tony Klug is right to say that the roadmap, in its present form, is lacking an enforcement mechanism. There is a real risk that the route of incremental steps will not take off or get bogged down quickly in mutual accusations from either side about the other not adhering to agreed commitments. That is why the idea of an international protectorate could be a way out and deserves careful consideration.
European carrots and sticks
European governments, together with the US, should prepare plans for a Nato-led peacekeeping force to operate in the occupied territories – in turn paving the way for a partial Israeli withdrawal. True, it is difficult to foresee some form of international security force operating on the West Bank and Gaza in present circumstances. But across Europe and the US, analysts and policy-makers are coming to the conclusion that only an external force can compensate for the lack of trust among the parties after years of violence.
Israelis want security but distrust the Palestinians to deliver it. Palestinians want an end to occupation but they lack, at present, the capacity and credibility to run their own affairs. The outside world laments the cycle of violence and is desperate to promote a peace accord. An international protectorate may be the worst solution except for all the alternatives that have been tried so far.
Nato could play a role in organising a post-Saddam peacekeeping force in Iraq. Why could it not do the same in Israel-Palestine? Constant European pleas for a more active and even-handed US stance are justified. But such arguments might carry greater weight if European governments showed they were prepared to support a settlement, not just with extra money, but also with troops for a Nato-led peacekeeping force.
Diplomacy aside, the EU should also learn to leverage its trade and aid policies in support of its political strategy. The EU needs America for any peace plan and the provision of a security force. But it does not need Washington to decide how to spend its money. When trying to increase its leverage in Israel, the EU should reflect on why so many moderate Israelis distrust it.
Many Israelis to the left of Ariel Sharon claim that Europe is insensitive to their plight. They feel that only the US takes their security concerns seriously. Yet in cultural or political terms they often feel closer to Europe. If the EU wants to enhance its influence, it needs to improve its image with those in Israel who share its basic objectives. It could do so by upgrading its partnership with Israel through deeper political ties and systematic Israeli participation in EU policies, for instance on crime and migration.
But such steps would depend on the Israelis first reaching a settlement with the Palestinians. In addition to providing incentives, the EU should also be ready to use some sticks. For example, it should keep a firm line on the question of exports from Israeli settlements. Such exports should not be labelled ‘made in Israel’ and should no longer enter the EU on preferential terms.
The EU should use a similar mix of carrots and sticks with the Palestinians. In the past, EU aid came without significant strings attached. Continuous US and Israeli insistence on further Palestinian reforms has probably been excessive; reforms are hard to implement in the context of continuing occupation. But the Palestinian Authority (PA) needs to make the transition from a liberation movement to a government. Clearly, a corrupt and authoritarian PA is not what the Palestinians want or deserve. Nor is it a credible partner for the Israelis. So the EU should make its 250 million annual aid to the PA conditional on tangible progress towards democracy and good governance. The EU should help to groom a new generation of Palestinian leaders and insist that the Palestinian Legislative Council has the ultimate say over the distribution of European donations.
On the incentive side, the EU should continue to spend money to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, and thus reduce the appeal of extremist groups. It should also step up support for various ‘state-building’ projects. There should be more targeted aid for the security forces and more money for civil administrators and legal experts preparing a new constitution. The EU must signal that it will help the Palestinians to build and run their own state provided all Palestinian groups forswear terrorist tactics.
To be successful in the Middle East, the EU needs a mixture of grand strategy and precise initiatives. Both Israelis and Palestinians would doubtless object to some of the measures suggested here. But the EU should learn to assert its position more forcefully and risk being criticised for it. A more effective European Union strategy on Israel-Palestine is both necessary and feasible.
